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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of taxes on the equilibrium ownership
structure of productive assets. Ownership structure includes the traditional
choice between debt and equity financing, but also the larger choice between
corporate and partnership forms.
A key feature of these alternative forms is that corporations are subject
to taxation at both the corporate and investor levels, whereas partnerships are
not. At the same time, depreciation and interest tax shields are taken at the
corporate tax rate for corporate assets and at investors' tax rates for partner-
ship assets. We find that assets endowed with excess non-interest tax deductions
are best held in partnership form by high tax bracket investors. Assets whose
allowed deductions are low enough to generate a net tax liability in corporate form
are best held as partnerships by low tax bracket investors. All other assets are
held in the corporate sector and are financed in a manner consistent with Miller's
(1977) capital structure equilibrium.
We argue that our analysis illuminates the tax aspects of such transactions
as mergers and sales or spin-offs of corporate assets to partnerships and royalty
trusts. We also show that our results afford a simple characterization of the
lease or buy decision.
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The corporate form has many well—known benefits. By separating
ownership from management, it allows productive assets to be managed by
those who are best qualified, regardless of their personal wealth or
attitudes toward risk. The corporate form also facilitates the exchange of
ownership claims among investors, and in so doing it allows the management
of the assets to proceed continuously, independent of the lives or fortunes
of individual owners.
Despite these benefits, however, many productive assets are owned
by noncorporate business entities, such as partnerships. This fact has
received special emphasis in recent years as corporations themselves have
often been instrumental in shifting assets outside the corporate sector
(see Cooper, 1984). Transactions in which corporate assets are sold to an
investor group and then leased back have been common for some time. A more
recent variation on this theme is Metromedia's outright sale in 1982 of
41,000 advertising billboards to wealthy investors through a limited
partnership (Abrams, 1984).Another example, which has attracted
considerable public attention, is the spin—off of natural resource
properties to be held directly by investors through a royalty trust. This
transaction has been carried out by Mesa Petroleum, Masonite and other
corporations (Cooper, 1984).
The prevalence of such activity suggests the need for a theory of
ownership structure. Finance theorists have focused their attention on the
mix of debt and equity claims that corporations should issue to finance
their ownership of productive assets, but this is only a part of the
problem. Coming prior to the financing question is the issue of whether or
not a given asset should be held in corporate form at all.—2—
The need for a broader theory, encompassing the choice of organi-
zational form as well as the financing mix, has been recognized in recent
papers by Fama and Jensen (1983 a, b). They devote particular attention to
the relative severity of incentive, or agency, problems among corporations,
partnerships, mutuals and other forms.
The purpose of our paper is to explore another aspect of the same
question, namely taxation. It is widely recognized that the corporate form
entails double taxation, while alternatives such as partnerships and
royalty trusts do not. However, the asset market equilibrium implications
of this difference in tax treatment have nor been fully analyzed.In
particular, we are interested in finding out which tangible assets should
be held in corporate form and which in partnership form. We also analyze
which investors will hold partnership shares in equilibrium and which will
hold corporate securities.
We abstract from uncertainty in order to eliminate all agency
problems and focus attention squarely on tax considerations. In Section 2,
we consider a simple one—period model, which allows us to completely
characterize the allocation of tangible assets among partnerships and
corporations, as well as the financing of those assets held in the
corporate sector. We show that assets endowed with excess tax deductions
are better held in partnership form by high tax bracket investors.
Similarly, assets that would generate a net tax liability if owned by a
corporation are better held in partnership form by low tax bracket
investors. All other assets are held in the corporate sector and are
financed in a manner consistent with Miller's (1977) capital structure
equilibrium.—3—
In Section 3, we consider asset market equilibrium in a multi—
period setting. Under the assumption that assets can be costlessly traded
or converted to another ownership form, we obtain results that are analo-
gous to those of the one—period case. The force driving the allocation of
assets to corporate and partnership form in the multiperiod case is the
desire to minimize total taxes in every period.
The next three sections are devoted to applications and elabora-
tions of our basic analysis. In Section 4 we show that a particularly
simple characterization of the lease—or—buy decision emerges as a by-
product of our results on optimal asset ownership. In Section 5 we show
how a given asset may naturally progress through different ownership forms
as its cash flows and depreciation allowances evolve over the course of its
useful life. In Section 6, we show that in an environment of capital gains
and recapture taxes, changes in corporate ownership, through mergers and
acquisitions or sales of assets, are an alternative to changes in ownership
form for minimizing taxes.
In Section 7 we briefly summarize our results and suggest some
further extensions.
2. The One—Period Case
2a. The structure of the model and the definition of equilibrium
Theoptimal packaging of tangible assets can be illustrated most
readily forthe one—period case. This case entails finite asset life,
whichwe later show to be an important element of the partnership form's
attractiveness,but at the same time it avoids the complication of
multiperiod term structure issues. We will also argue in Section 3 that,—4—
when assets can be costlessly repackaged, the multiperiod case collapses,
with minor modifications, to the one—period case.
We assume an exogenous supply of tangible assets at the beginning
of the period. Each asset generates an identical pre—tax cash flow,
C (>0). at the end of the period. Any production technology using these
assets exhibits constant returns to scale, so we can discuss the optimal
packaging of any one of these assets in isolation from the others. For
each asset, a, the owner is allowed to make an exogenously determined
non—cash charge, Da, against a's pre—tax cash flow. This charge could be
thought of as depreciation or depletion. Asset a's taxable income is then
(C —IDa),and in the absence of other deductions its after—tax cash flow is
C —t(C— wherer is the applicable tax rate.1
Each member, i, of a set of individual investors is endowed with
initial wealth, consisting of some amount of tangible assets. The inves-
tors either trade these assets directly or package them in the form of
securities before trading. Securities, which represent indirect claims on
tangible assets, come in the form of corporate or personal debt and cor-
porate stock. That is, an investor can issue his own debt securities
against his personal tangible holdings, or he can organize a corporation to
hold the tangibles and have the corporation issue securities. Each
investor's objective is to end up with a portfolio of tangibles and/or
securities that maximizes his future consumption. Equivalently, such a
portfolio will maximize the investor's after—tax cash flow.
The after—tax cash flow that is ultimately produced by a given
tangible asset depends both on the form in which it is packaged and on its
final owner. If asset a is owned directly by investor i, its income is
taxed at i's exogenously specified personal tax rate, r, and the asset's—5—
after—tax cash flow is C —r(C— Werefer to any such directly held
tangibleas being packaged in partnership form.
2
AUtangibles held in corporate form are subject to corporate tax
at the rate t.Whetherthey are subject to further personal tax depends
on how the corporations finance them. We assume, following Miller (1977),
that investors' returns on corporate stock are tax exempt. An asset
packaged as corporate stock thus escapes double taxation, and its after—tax
cash flow is simply C — — Da).
By contrast, all interest on bonds is assumed to be taxable to
the bondholder and tax deductible to the issuer.If an-asset is packaged
as corporate debt, therefore, we must divide its cash flows into interest
andprincipalpayments.If an asset Is to be fully debt financed, a
corporation can promise after—corporate—tax debt service payments that
exactly match the asset's after—corporate—tax cash inflows. Thus if the
asset's value in this form is V, the interest payment at rate r, is rV
and the principal payment is C —r(C—Da)—r(1—r)V.Since principal
payments are tax exempt to bondholders, this leaves total after—tax
receipts for investor i of r(1 — +C —i(C
—Da)—r(1—
Investors'packaging and trading activities produce market values
for all tangible asset packages. In conjunction with the after—tn cash
flows described above, these market values in turn define after—tax rates
of return. For example, if investor i holds asset a in partnership form,




where is a's market value in this form.—6—
Analogously, i's after—tax return from holding a in corporate









Severalfeatures of these definitions are worth noting. First,
from (2) corporate stock yields the same after—tax return to any investor.
This is of course true of all tax—exempt securities.
Second, the after—tax cash flow from any tangible asset package
can be represented as the asset's pre—tax cash flow, C, minus the net tax
payments attributable to the asset in that form. This is obvious for
partnerships and corporate stock from (1) and (2).It can be seen for
corporate bonds if we rewrite (3) as




wherethe second term in the numerator is the net tax payment term. In the
absence of debt financing, tax payments would be Tc(C —0a)as in (2).
However, if r>t ,debtfinancing generates a net tax shield and the tax
payments attributable to the asset are reduced.
Third, if a bond pays interest at the market rate, r, its market
value is equal to its principal and we can further interpret (3). If
=C—t(C—Da)—r(1—t)v:. (5)—7—
then substituting (5) into (3) results in
0ai r(1 -Ti). (6)
That is, any bondholder's after—tn return is equal to the after—tax
interest rate. Moreover, from (5)
C —r(C —a) a c
1 + r(1 —t)
That is, the value of an asset in corporate bond form, paying the market
interest rate, is equal to the asset's after—corporate—tax cash flow
discounted at the after—corporate—tax interest rate.4
Faced with this set of conditions, investors package and trade
assets, as permitted by the tax authorities, until the following equi—
5 librium is reached:
Definition:Asset market equilibrium consists of (a) an
ownership form or package (e.g., partnership, corporate debt, corporate
stock) for each tangible asset, (b) a market value for each asset package
and (c) an allocation of asset packages among investors such that (1) asset
and securities markets clear and (2) at current market prices, no investor
can alter his portfolio (e.g., trading or repackaging assets) in such a way
as to increase his after—tn return.
Equivalently, each tangible asset must be packaged and allocated
to a final investor in such a way that its value is maximized. This
follows the basic logic of the Fisher Separation principle: regardless of
his personal preferences or tax status, any investor will want to package—8—
the tangibles he is endowed with in the way that maximizes his future
consumption opportunities.
In deriving subsequent results, we will also find it useful to
invoke the following equivalent concept of equilibrium:
Proposition I: A configuration of tangible asset packages, final
owners and market values is an equilibrium if and only if it minimizes
total future tax payments relative to the set of feasible, mutually
voluntary transactions.
Proof: The configuration in question defines a market value,
for each investor's net worth and an after—tax return, pi.on that net
worth. Total after—tax cash flow in the economy, then, is simply the sum,
z Vi(l +p5,of cash returns across investors. Equivalently, the
i
economy's total wealth consists of the sum of tangible asset packages.
Each such package, as we have seen, generates a pre—tax cash flow, C, minus
the net tax payments, a, attributable to that package.Since summing
across all asset packages would also give us the economy's total after—tax
cash flows, we must have
z Vi(l +pi)=z(C—Ta). (8)
i a
Suppose now that the ownership configuration is not an equi—
librium. Then some investor j can trade at current market prices in such a
way as to increase to p. Since all trades are voluntary, this could
not result in a lower return on net worth for any other investor. After
the trade, we must have—9—
E Vi(l +p1)+V3(l+p3)>EV1(I +t) (9)
i#j i
Equivalently,total after—tax cash flows after the trade are equal to the
sumacrossasset packages, where Ta' represents the post—trade taxes
attributable to asset a. Thus from (9)
-Ta')>E(C-
Ta) (10)
Since total pre—tax cash flows are unchanged, (10) holds only if
ETa cETa.This proves that any non—equilibrium ownership configuration
fails to minimize total taxes.
Now consider an ownership configuration that does not minimize
taxes. Then there is some feasible transaction that investors will
voluntarily undertake that reduces total taxes. Since the transaction is
voluntary, no investor's after—tax return is reduced by it. From (8), at
least one investor's after—tax return is increased by this transaction.
Therefore the initial configuration could not hve been an equilibrium.
This completes the proof.
Zb. Asset packaging in the corporate sector
Given the basic structure of the model, we can now describe the
equilibrium allocation of tangibles between partnership and corporate f on
and the financing of those tangibles held in the corporate sector. We
begin with the latter question, which has been analyzed by Miller (1977).
If we assume temporarily that all tangibles are held in corporate
form, our model is equivalent to Miller's, and we can make use of his
findings. Three of his results are noteworthy in our context.— 10—
First,if r is the pre—tax return on debt, the equilibrium
after—tax return on equity must be r(1.— t). Thus, the market value of
any tangible packaged as corporate equity is given by
C —T(C—
(11) 1 + r(1 —
Ifthis were not the case, then from (7) some entrepreneur could increase
his portfolio return by repackaging equity as debt or vice versa.6
Second, while the total equilibrium supply of equity must be that
which drives the after—tax return to r(1 —t),it doesn't matter which
specific assets are packaged as equity or debt. Comparison of (11) and (7)
indicates that an asset must have the same market value in either form.
Third, in the absence of uncertainty, investors have specialized
portfolios.From (6), any bondholder earns an after—tax return of
r(1 —ti),while any equityholder earns r(1 —t).Therefore no investor
with > tcan hold bonds, while no investor with t1 <rcan hold stock
p c p c
in equilibrium, since they would not be maximizing their after—tax return
if they did.
2c. Partnerships
We can now relax the assumption that all tangibles are held in
the corporate sector.In that event, there are two cases in which
investors can increase their after—tax returns by shifting an asset from
corporate to partnership form. The first of these is described in the
following proposition:— 1].—
PropositionII: If an asset's allowed depreciation, a, is such
that C <Da,i must be held in partnership form in equilibrium as long as
there are any investors with >tcholding corporate equity.
Proof: If any such asset is held in corporate form, whether debt





Aninvestor with >rwho owns equity is earning an after—tax
return of r(1. —r).If this investor were to purchase asset a for and
repackage it as a partnership, his after—tax return would be
—1i(—?) C—t (C—Da)
—1>_______________ — 1 r(1 —r).(13) C
Thushe could increase his after—tax return by undertaking this
transaction.
Conversely, if i holds a in partnership form initially, its value
must be at least a and i must be earning an after—tax return of at least
r(1 —r).If i switches to corporate equity, his after—tax return will at
best remain unchanged. In addition, if asset a is repackaged in corporate
form its after—tax return will be at most r(1 —t) (equity)or r(1 —
(debt).Since these returns were already available on other corporate
securities, no investor's position is improved if a is repackaged.
Therefore, partnership form is the equilibrium package for a. This com-
pletes the proof.— 12—
Assetswith C < havebeen termed "negatively taxed" by Bailey
(1974). Their allowed deductions are such that, as long as the owner has
other income to offset, their after—tax cash flow exceeds their pre—tax
cash flow. This is the principle that lies behind oil and gas drilling
partnerships as well as various real estate, motion picture, research and
development and other tax shelter investments sold in partnership form.
Intuitively, one would expect such negatively taxed assets to be
most attractive to investors in the highest tax brackets. This intuition
is confirmed and generalized to any assets held in partnership form,
whether negatively taxed or not, in the following proposition:
Proposition III: If two assets are held in partnership form by
two investors with unequal tax rates, the asset with the larger allowed
deductions must be held in equilibrium by the investor with the higher
personal tax rate.
Proof: Suppose assets a and b, with >Dbare held in
partnership form. Suppose initially that investor i holds asset b while
investor jholdsasset a and t.Theafter—tax rates of return for
p p








Henceinvestor i could pay the following amount for asset a and still earn
the same after—tax rate of return:
+ia
— p p — . (15a)
l+p






For the current ownership pattern to be an equilibrium, it must be that
(16)
Otherwise exchange is mutually preferable. But (16) can be shown to be
equivalent to (Db —Da)(Ti—1J)>0,which is false. The condition is
satisfied only if investorholds asset a and investor b holds asset j.
Thus equilibrium can occur only if the high—tax bracket investor holds the
high—deduction asset to the extent of his ability to do so. This completes
the proof.
In the last line of the above proof, the phrase "to the extent of
his ability to do so" deserves some clarification. If tax arbitrage were
permitted, investors in the very highest tax bracket would hold all of the
negatively taxed assets in equilibrium. If such an asset were held by an
investor with any lower tax bracket, the high tax bracket investor would
issue personal debt to buy it. Not only would this reduce taxes (or
increase tax credits) attributable to the asset itself, but the interest
deduction to the debt issue would always outweigh any additional taxes paid— 1k—
bythe debt holder. With tax arbitrage restrictions, however, the highest
tax bracket investors have United ability to keep acquiring assets.
In the latter event, Proposition III implies that a sorting
equilibrium will develop. If we rank investors in descending order of
and assets in descending order of Da, the investor with the highest will
keep acquiring assets in descending order of Da until he runs up against
the tax arbitrage constraint. The process is then repeated for the
investor with the next highest tax rate and so on, until either the supply
of negatively taxed assets is exhausted or we reach an investor with =
t. From(12) and (13), such an investor would be just indifferent between
holding a negatively taxed asset in partnership or corporate equity form.
Besides negatively taxed assets held by high tax bracket
investors, there is a second case in which greater value can be achieved by
packaging an asset in partnership rather than corporate form. This arises
at the opposite end of the allowed deduction spectrum.
Proposition IV: Any asset with < C/U +r)must be held in
partnership form in equilibrium as long as there are investors with ¶C
holding bonds.
Proof: Suppose such an asset were packaged in corporate debt
form.7 Any investo* with r' c r who held bonds would bewilling to buy
the asset in this form at its market price V. From (4), (6) and (7) the
investor would earn an after—tax return of r(1 —t') onthis asset,
p








If this investor switched the asset to partnership form, his
after—tax return would be:
C —Ti(C—
= p —1. (18)
B
Subtracting (17) from (18):
(t- r1)[C-(1+ ai ai= C p
[1 + r(1 —
"tB
Since (19) is positive for a C Cf(1 +r),the asset cannot be held in
corporate form in equilibrium.
Conversely, if the asset were held in partnership form, its value
must be at least V and its owner must be earning an after—tax return of at
least r(1 —ri).Consequently, there is nothing to be gained by switching
theassetto corporate form. This completes the proof.




The right—hand side of (20) is simply the total tax deductions
available against asset a when it is packaged in corporate debt form.
These consist of depreciation and the interest on the corporation's debt.— 16—
When(20) holds, these deductions are insufficient to shield the asset's
entire pre—tax cash flow, C.If held in corporate debt form, then, the
asset generates a positive tax liability at the corporate level and again
at the investor level. Under these circumstances the partnership form,
which eliminates double taxation, is advantageous.9 This is precisely the
argument that has been used in support of the royalty trust concept,
whereby a corporation spins off an income—producing property to its
shareholders. The property's income is then taxable to the shareholders
directly, as in a partnership, but corporate tax is avoided. It should be
noted, though, that it is not sufficient to have < Tinorder for the
p c
royalty trust form to yield tax advantages. It is also necessary that the
assets held in trust be low depreciation assets (i.e., ?CC/(1 + r)).
Since assets with < C/Cl + r) are more heavily taxed than
those with higher allowed deductions, it seems that they would be most
efficiently held by investors in the lowest tax brackets. In fact, if the
investors in the lowest tax bracket can borrow, they will hold all such
assets in equilibrium:
Proposition V: Let be the minimum personal tax rate.In
equilibrium, all assets with C C/CL + r) must be held in partnership
form by investors whose tax rate is as long as these investors can
borrow without limit.
Proof: We know from Proposition IV that all such assets must be
held in partnership form by investors with C T. Let asset a be held by
investor i with ¶mln < < I .Theasset's value, a, must be such that




Otherwise, investori could have earned a higher after—tax return
byholding bonds. Ifan investor with tax rate borrows aat interest
p
rate r from investor i to purchase the asset, the difference, ATa, in total





[C -ti(C—Va)] Ta>(tt_tmln)((c_Da)_r p
(23)
p 1+r(1—r)
=(t — mitt)[C —Da(l+r) >
p p (1 +r(1—J)
Thus,total taxes are always reduced by this transaction. This
completes the proof.'°
Finally, if the lowest tax investors are limited in their ability
to borrow, the logic of Proposition III dictates a sorting equilibrium.
Investors in the lowest tax bracket will purchase assets beginning with
those having the lowest Da and working up in ascending order of Da. Once
these investors' ability to purchase assets is exhausted, the process
continues with the investor having the next highest tax rate and so on
until either the supply of assets with Da <C/(l+r)or the wealth of
investors with <t isexhausted.
p c
Together, Propositions I—V plus Miller's (1977) analysis
completely characterize the asset market equilibrium. Assets with the very— 18—
highestand lowest allowed deductions will be organized as partnerships and
sold to investors with the highest and lowest tax rates, respectively. In
the face of borrowing restrictions, these partnerships will be sorted, with
those having the highest deductions going to investors with the highest tax
rates and vice versa. All remaining assets with 01(1 +r)c <Cwill be
held in corporate form. All such assets have the same value, so there is
no sorting of assets within the corporate sector. However, the total of




3. The Multiperiod Case
As long as investors can costlessly trade or repackage assets
each period, equilibrium in a multiperiod setting can be viewed as a
sequence of single—period equilibria. In that event, many of the results
of Section 2 carry over to the multiperiod case with only minor modifica-
tion.
We assume in this section, therefore, that any investor or
corporation can hold an asset for one period, collect that period's
after—tax cash flow, and then sell or repackage the asset with no taxable
recognition of gains or losses and no recapture of depreciation. Although
a complete equilibrium analysis of capital gains and recapture taxes is
beyond the scope of this paper, we do consider some of their consequences
in Section 6.
Under the frictionless repackaging assumption of this section, an
asset's ownership form can be optimized period—by—period. Moreover, each
asset's end—of—period market value is independent of its current owner and
ownership form. In the aggregate, therefore, the configuration of asset— 19—
ownershipwill be rearranged each period so as to minimize total taxes for
that period.
In this environment, three analogues to the results of Section 2
are worth noting. Because they follow the same logic developed in that
section, we state them here without proof.
First, if C1 andareasset a's pre—tax cash flow and allowed
deduction, respectively, in the most immediate future period, the asset
will be held in partnership form during this period as long as C1 < and
there are investors with > t holding corporate equity. Thus if an
asset is negatively taxed even for only one period, it will be sold as a
partnership to high tax bracket investors during that period.
Second, if the maximum corporate tax deductions (depreciation
plus interest) for an asset in a given period are less than that period's
pre—tax cash flow, the asset must be held in partnership f on during that
period as long as there are investors with < r holding bonds. Stated
in algebraic form, analogous to equation (20), the partnership condition is
a ________________ C1>D1+r 1+(1) , (24)
where r is the one—period market interest rate and is the asset's
end—of—period market value. The asset's future value enters this condition
because if an owner can borrow against that value, it affects the size of
available interest deductions in the most immediate future period.
Rearranging and simplifying expression (24) results in the following





Thissuggests that the larger is an asset's future value relative to its
current cash flow, the less likely it is to be held inpartnership form by
low tax bracket investors. As we discuss further inSection 5, the best
candidates for low taxbracketpartnerships, or royalty trusts, are assets
whose future value is declining relative to currentpre—tax cash flow.
Finally, if (C1 —rV)/(1
+r)C< C,the asset will be held
in corporate formduringthat next period. As in Miller (1977), the
aggregate debt and equity financing of these corporate assets will be such
that the marginal holder of either type of securityearns a one—period
return of r(1 —r).Hencethe current value, V, of any corporate asset,
whether debt or equity financed, is given by





The analysis thus far provides a new perspective onleasing.
which has previously been recognized as a device forseparating asset
ownership from asset management.1' It may be, for example, that an asset
can generate its maximum pre—tax cash flows only if it is managed by a
specific person or entity. However, the same cash flows and associated tax
deductions may be worth more if they are owned by someone else. In such
cases, where the optimal owner of an asset differs from its optimal
manager, a potentially profitable lease transaction is available.
In this context, the analysis of Sections 2 and 3 can be thought
of as identifying the optimal owner of any tangible asset.In the
one—period case, for example, we have seen that assets with C Cor
<CI(1+r)are optimally held directly by investors in partnership form.— 21—
Ifthe same asset is most efficiently managed by a corporation, the
investor—owners could simply lease it to the corporation.12 If
C/(1+r) <Da<C,on the other hand the asset is optimally owned in
corporate form. Leasing can arise for such assets when they are best
managed by an entity whose tax rate is other than Tc (say, another
corporation that finds itself in a nontax—paying position).'3
The fact that optimal asset owners can span the whole range of
tax brackets highlights a point made by Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976):
Sometimes it pays f or a low tax bracket entity to lease from a high tax
bracket owner, but other times the reverse is true. The direction in which
the transaction goes is determined by the tax bracket of the optimal
manager and the magnitude of the asset's available deductions
(depreciation, interest, etc.) relative to its pre—tax cash flow.
5. A Life Cycle Model of Ownership
While the multiperiod case, discussed in Chapter 3. implicitly
incorporates changes in cash flows and allowed deductions over time, we
have not thus far taken the typical pattern of these changes into account.
For many assets, both pre—tax cash flows and depreciation tax shields tend
to decline over the asset's life. However, with accelerated depreciation,
allowed deductions often decline at a faster rate than the pre—tax cash
flows. Such assets may follow a natural ownership life cycle.
For example, when it is young a tangible asset may be negatively
taxed, in which case it should be owned by investors whose tax rates exceed
the corporate rate. When it is middle—aged, depreciation tax shields have
declined and the asset may be positively but lightly taxed. In this phase,
corporate ownership will be optimal. When it is old, depreciation tax— 22—
shieldshave declined further and borrowing against the asset's future
value no longer provides as much of an interest tax shield. The asset has
thus become heavily taxed and should be owned in partnership f on by
investors with low tax rates——e.g., as a royalty trust.
These principles can be demonstrated with a simple model of the
optimal ownership decision. Since this is a dynamic optimization problem,
it is natural to formulate it in a continuous—time framework. As before,
we abstract from uncertainty, although the model could be generalized in
that direction.
Assume that the pre—tax cash flow C(t) grows at a constant rate
g, namely
dc/C gdt . (27)
We assume that the pre—tax cash flow declines through time——i.e.,
g <0.Let B(t) be the tax basis of the asset, and let depreciation (and
depletion) be at a constant proportional rate 5. Thus depreciation is
D(t)SB(t) and it evolves according to
dD/D =dB/B=—Sdt . (28)
The extent to which the pre—tax cash flow is sheltered from
taxation is summarized by the ratio of depreciation to pre—tax cash flow
y(t)D(t)/c(t), which evolves according to
dy/y =—(6+g)dt . (29)
A typical tangible asset becomes more heavily taxed through time——i.e.,
a >—gand thus y declines through time.— 23—
Thelife cycle for the ownership of the asset can be summarized
by the value of the ratio -y.We know that as long as y >1——i.e.,
D(t) >C(t)—theasset is negatively taxed and thus should be owned in
partnership form by investors above the corporate tax rate. We expect that
where y1 the asset should be repackaged into corporate form. We also
expect that the asset should eventually be converted into a low—tax royalty
trust. Evidently there is a critical value y* c1where it is optimal to
convert the asset from corporate to royalty trust form. This life cycle is
summarized in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1
Life Cycle for Ownership of Tangible Assets
Youth Middle Age Old Age
1>1 l>y>y* y*>y
high tax corporation royalty
partnership trust
It remains to identify the critical ratio y*. Assume for now
that all royalty trusts are owned by nontaxable investors. (Remember that
royalty trusts should be held by investors in tax brackets at least as low
as those of corporate bondholders, and that most corporate bonds are held
by nontaxable institutions). Hence the value of a royalty trust R(t) is
given by capitalizing its pre—tax cash flows at the pre—tax interest rate:
R(t) f C(s)e_5_t)ds =C(t)/(r—g) . (30)
Now consider the value of the asset while it is still in
corporate form.The after—corporate—tax operating cash flows are
x(t) (1_Tc)C(t) +tD(t).At the optimal time t*thecorporation will— 24—
convertthe asset into a royalty trust with value R(t*). The value of the
asset while still in corporate form V(t) is given by capitalizing these
cash flows at the after—corporate—tax interest rate:
V(t) 1 X(s)e_tc)(5_t)ds +
(1_t)C(t)[1_e_t*_t)]/A+
—x(t*_t) +C(t)e /(r—g) (31)
where A E r(1—t)—g and p E r(1—'r) +iS.
The optimal time t* to repackage the asset from corporate to





which can be rewritten as
C(t*)/(r_g)=X(t*)I[r(1_t)_gJ
, (32')
where the LHS is the value of the royalty trUst and the RHSisthe value of
a notional asset in corporate form whose after—tax cash flows grow at the
rate g.
An alternative, but instructive way to derive this condition is
to consider net taxes paid as a result of keeping the asset in corporate
form.Taxesbefore financing are tc(C_D)• At the optimal conversion time,
the value of the asset is given by the royalty trust valuation formula
CI(r—g).If the asset is financed with debt, the tax saving due to— 25—
interestexpense is TrC/(r—g). At the optimal conversion time, the net
tax effect is exactly zero:
T[C(t*) —D(t*)]=trC(t*)/(r_g) (33)
It can be verified that (33) is equivalent to (32).
Note that the corporate tax rate can be eliminated from (33).
Hence the optimal time to convert from corporate to royalty trust form is
independent of the corporate tax rate. This result is reminiscent of our
finding in the one—period case that the critical ratio of depreciation to
pre—tax cash flow for determining ownership form is independent of tax
rates.
We can solve (32) or (3) for the critical ratio y that separates
the corporate from the royalty trust stage:
5 D(t*)/C(t*) —g/(r—g) . (34)
Note that this ratio only makes sense if g C0,when pre—tax cash flow
declines through time. To understand why, consider the watershed perpe-
tuity case where g0. Assume first that depreciation is zero. Then (34)
is identically zero and the asset is equally valuable in corporate or
royalty trust form. For example, if the asset is financed in corporate
form by an issue of debt. pre—tax cash flow is exactly sheltered by inter-
est expense. In this case, corporate borrowing also eliminates double
taxation and hence low—tax investors are indifferent between receiving the
pre—tax cash flow directly through a royalty trust or indirectly through
interest payments. Now introduce depreciation. The associated tax shields
are more valuable to a corporation (or high—tax investors) than to low—tax
investors. Hence the asset should never be owned in a low—tn royalty
trust.— 26—
Similarly,when g > 0 interest expense is greater than or equal
to pre—tax cash flow.Both the excess interest expense and the
depreciation tax shields are more valuable in corporate (or high—tax
partnership) form than in royalty trust form owned by low—tax investors.
Thus royalty trusts only make sense for wasting assets, where g 'C 0.
When g C 0, the possibility of conversion increases the value of
assets and thus the net present value associated with investment decisions.
For example, consider the value of an asset in its corporate stage. Since
it can be shown that the critical ratio y* occurs at time
= +
we have from (31) that
V(t) =(l_tc)C(t:)/fx
+
+ C(t) [y(t)/y*] d)/(_g) -(l_t)C(t)[1(t)/1*]6/X
- (35)
The first two terms correspond to the value of the asset if it is kept in
corporate form forever. Hence the last three terms represent the extra
value due to the opportunity to convert the asset into a royalty trust.
It would be nice to have a simple valuation expression for any
asset which is initially negatively taxed, while it is still in its high
tax partnership stage. Unfortunately, this requires a knowledge of the
sequence of investors who own these partnerships, and their required rates
14
of return.
One final point about royalty trusts is worth making, namely that
creation of royalty trusts only makes sense for assets whose depreciated— 27—
bookvalue is less than current market value.To demonstrate this,







Now suppose that depreciated book value equals current market value——
B(t) —V(t)——andthat the rate of depreciation equals the rate of decline
in pre—tax cash flow:6 =—g.Then this valuation expression simplifies
to B(t) V(t) aC(t)/(r—g)=R(t).Since all variables grow at the same
rate, this relation always holds. Hence book value always equals market
value, and the value of an asset in corporate form is the same as in a
royalty trust. This result corresponds to the special case where account-
ing depreciation exactly equals economic depreciation. Myers, Dill and
Bautista (1976) found that corporations were indifferent between leasing
andbuyingin this case. In Section 4 we argued that their leasing
analysis could be reinterpreted as a statement about optimal owners of
assets——i.e., when accounting depreciation equals economic depreciation
there is no optimal owner.
It intuitively follows for the faster depreciation schedules
assumedhere——i.e., 6 >—g——thatconversion to a royalty trust should be
delayeduntila subsequent time when depreciated book value is less than
prevailing market value. To verify this, suppose the contrary, namely that
it is optimal to convert now, so that, D(t)oB(t) =6V(t)=oR(t)
6C(t)/(r—g). But then y(t) D(t)/C(t) =61(r—g)>y*.Hence it is too
early to convert to a royalty trust. In summary, conversion to a royalty
trust only makes sense when depreciated book value is less than current
value. This result is reminiscent of our finding in the one—period case
that royalty trusts only make sense if D <C/(l+r).—28—
The analysis thus f at explains how high tax partnerships and
royalty trusts can dominate uninterrupted corporate ownership of tangible
assets. However there may be other mechanisms which serve a similar
purpose, particularly in the face of capital gains and recapture taxes.It
is to this topic that we now turn.
6. Mergers and Acquisitions
We have seen that royalty trusts can be an effective mechanism
for reducing taxes on a wasting asset like an oil field. However it has
been claimed that mergers and acquisitions also accomplish the same thing,
through the associated step—up in the tax basis of assets.Indeed U.S.
Steel justified its $7 billion acquisition of Marathon Oil in part on
precisely this tax reduction. The relationship between royalty trusts and
acquisitions as alternative mechanisms for reducing taxes on wasting assets
was highlighted by Mesa Petroleum's tender offer for Gulf Oil, and Gulf's
subsequent acquisition by Socal for $14 billion. Mesa's offer proposed to
reorganize Gulf's oil—producing properties as royalty trusts specifically
to reduce taxes.
Whether a royalty trust or an acquisition is the better way to
reduce taxes on a wasting asset, and whether acquisitions of nonwasting
assets yield tax benefits, are questions that depend critically on the
specifics of the tax code. (From the last section, we know that royalty
trusts are not appropriate for nonwasting assets.) The mechanism and
current tax law regarding creation of a royalty trust are as follows.
First the corporation places certain of its assets in a trust. The tax
basis of the trust is identical to that of the assets. There is no taxable
event upon creation of the trust. However there is a taxable event upon— 29—
distributionof the beneficial interest in the trust to stockholders. The
distribution is treated like any other dividend; it is taxed at ordinary
income rates, calculated on the basis of the observed secondary market
value of trust units.
In equilibrium, the effective tax associated with distribution of
a royalty trust is likely to be minimal. Since low—tax investors are the
logical owners of royalty trusts, it makes sense for them to purchase the
stock just before distribution, so that the distribution is taxed at their
rate!6 As mentioned in the last section, these investorsare likely to be
nontaxable. Hence the only taxes associated with such- a distribution have
to do with the recognition of capital gains by the original (high tax)
stockholders. In keeping with the rest of the paper1 we assume that the
effective tax on capital gains is minimal. (For example, stockholders may
be able to recognize offsetting losses.)
The mechanism and applicable tax law regarding an acquisition to
step up the tax basis of assets are as follows.
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The acquiring corpora-
tion purchases the stock of the acquired corporation, thus generating a
capital gains liability for stockholders. (As before, we assume an effec-
tive capital gains tax rate of zero.) The acquiring corporation then
"liquidates" the acquired corporation.'8 Under Section 334 of the Internal
Revenue Code, the acquiring company is allowed to step up the tax basis of
the assets of the acquired company to a level equal to the value of the
consideration paid for the acquired company. However, under Section 1245,
the acquiring company is liable at ordinary income tax rates for recapture
of any post—1962 depreciation.— 30—
Inthe absence of capital gains taxation, an equivalent mechanism
is for another corporation to purchase the asset directly from the corpora-
tion that currently owns it.In either case there is a corporate tax on
recapture.
The comparison between an acquisition and creation of a royalty
trust as a mechanism for reducing taxes under current tax law thus depends
on the relation of the current market value of an asset to its initial book
value. Suppose first that the current market value of the asset, which
incorporates its optimal tax treatment, is less than its initial book
value. Then the acquisition mechanism actually increases taxes in present
value terms. In other words, any reduction in taxes due to a step—up in
basis is exactly offset by taxes paid due to recapture. Furthermore, the
taxes paid because of recapture are due immediately, while the taxes saved
because of the step—up in basis are spread into the future. Hence, if
current market value is less than initial book value, creation of a royalty
trust is the appropriate way to reduce taxes on a wasting asset.
The polar alternative case is where initial book value is trivial
compared to current market value. For example, oil fields that were
established before the dramatic increases in oil prices are likely to be in
this situation. In this case, the tax due to recapture is trivial compared
to the step—up in basis. Bence it is virtually costless to step up the
basis to current market value. Furthermore, we know from the last section
that royalty trusts do not make sense if book value is as large as current
market value. Hence an acquisition creates more value than conversion to a
royalty trust in this case.
To recapitulate, the tax advantages under current law of acquisi-
tions versus conversions to royalty trusts depend on the relation between— 31—
currentmarket value and initial book value.If market value is below
initial book value, conversion to a royalty trust is advantageous, but an
acquisition is not. If market value is substantially above initial book
value, the tax on recapture is small compared to the tax benefits
associated with a step—up in basis; hence an acquisition dominates
conversion to a royalty trust.
Our analysis also addresses the tax consequences of a sale and
leaseback arrangement between corporations designed to step up an asset's
basis. Such an arrangement can be decomposed into the sale part and the
leaseback part. We argued in Section 4 that any perceived benefits in a
lease were attributable to the asset being held by its optimal owner.
Hence any net tax benefits have to do with the sale part. But we noted
above that the tax consequences here were the same as with an acquisition
of stock. Hence our use of the term acquisition can be considered to
include assets sales as well, whether or not there is a leaseback arrange-
ment.
Finally, we have seen that any advantage of a royalty trust
relative to acquisition by another company under current law has to do with
the avoidance of recapture——for example, when market value is below
historic book value. Proposed tax law even eliminates this advantage for
royalty trusts. According to this proposed law, the corporate tax
consequences of creation of a royalty trust are the same as if the
corporation had sold the asset, entailing recapture and capital gains. In
this case, since the tax consequences to the corporation that initially
owns the asset are the same, it makes sense for another corporation to buy
the asset and step up its basis to market value. Hence, under proposed
law, conversion to royalty trust is always dominated by acquisition.— 32—
7.Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the effect of taxeson the
equilibrium ownership structure of tangible assets. This issueencompasses
the corporate capital structure decision, but it also includes thebroader
choicebetween corporate and partnership form.
For some interesting special cases we are able tocompletely
characterizethe asset market equilibrium. Subject to the qualifications
discussed above, our basic results can be summarized as follows:nega-
tively taxed assets are best held by high tax bracket investors, while
positively taxed assets are best held by low tax bracket investors. All
negatively taxed assets will thus be organized as high tax bracket
partnerships. All assets that are positively taxed, even -after allowance
is made for maximum corporate interest deductions, will be organizedas low
tax bracket partnerships. All other assets will be held in corporate form,
and their aggregate financing proportions will be consistent with Miller's
-
(1977)equilibrium.
Other aspects of the problem remain to be studied in more detail.
For example, in Section 6 we have only touched on the issues posed bya
realistic treatment of capital gains and recapture taxes.
A second major task would be to integrate the incentive problem
aspects of ownership structure with the tax considerations analyzed in this
paper. As mentioned, Fama and Jensen (1983 a and b) and Wolfson (1983)
have discussed the relative severity of incentive problems entailed by the
corporate and partnership forms. The theory would be further advanced by a
more detailed analysis of the trade—offs between economizing on taxes and
mitigating incentive problems.- 33-
FOOTNOTES
1. Alternatively, Da determines the fraction, (1 —f) ofthe asset's
pre—tax cash flow that is taxable. Black (1971) refers to this
taxable fraction as the asset's tax bracket.
2. We make no distinction between partnerships and soleproprietorships.
For our purposes, the key feature of either form is that the asset is
not subject to double taxation.
3. In similar fashion, if investor I holds asset a inpartnership form
and finances it by issuing personal debt to investor j, the value of
the debt can be represented as
i a i ja
[r (C —D) —(t — r)rV C p pP
P
1+pJ
Anychainof securities issues against a tangible asset can ultimately
be expressed in the same general form.
4. The same rule also holds in the multiperiod case as Ruback (1983) has
shown. Analogously, if investor i issues personal debt against a
directly held tangible asset, the value of this debt is given by
C —T(C — Da)
= p
P 1+r(1—t1)
5. The authorities will limit tax—arbitrage transactions, which consist
of investors taking simultaneous long and short positions in assets
that are subject to different tax treatment. A prime example is
borrowing by high tax bracket investors to purchase tax—exempt— 34—
securities,such as equity. Some amount of these transactions can be
admitted in our model, as they are in actual fact. What is necessary
is that tax arbitrage not be allowed to eliminate all differences in
after—ta yields across securities of different types and across
investors in different tax brackets.
6. If corporations issue debt to repurchase equity, or vice versa, they
are engaging in a kind of tax arbitrage. The ability of the corporate
sector to undertake such transactions without limit, while individual
investors cannot, is a fundamental determinant of equilibrium. If the
investor with the highest personal tax rate, ¶ma, could borrow
without limit to purchase stock, all tangible assets would be packaged
as stock, and all corporate stock would be held by this investor, who
would finance his holdings by issuing personal debt to other inves-
tors. In that event, the equilibrium after—tax return on equity would
max ber(1—t ).
7.Since the asset would have the same market value if it were packaged
in corporate stock form, it is sufficient to examine the corporate
debt case.
S. If C >Da(l+r),C —> rDa.Adding and subtracting rC and
rt(C — fromthe right—hand side of this inequality gives
C — — r(1—tc)(C
—Da)+r(C—t(C
—Da))which in turn implies
(20).
9. If an asset is held in corporate stock form, it of course generates
positive taxliabilitiesat the corporate level but none at the
investor level. A further implication of Proposition IV, then, is
that it can be worthwhile to submit to the corporate tax only if the— 35—
corporation'staxable income is not "too large"; that is, only if
C/(1 +r).
10. If there are tax—exempt investors, they will bidup the prices of
these assets until their return is exactly r. This implies that all
such assets will have a value of Cf(1 +r),in which case the
partnership condition is equivalent to Da <
11.See Millet and Upton (1976), Lewellen, Long and McConnell (1976) and
Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976) for more extensive discussions of
leasing. Our conclusions are consistent with these authors.Our
purpose here is simply to show that the leasing question can be
imbedded in the larger question of who should optimally own a given
tangible asset in equilibrium.
12. Alternatively, as is usually done in oil drilling or other tax shelter
deals, the limited partners can sign a management contract with the
general partner (frequently a corporation). Or under the royalty
trust concept, a set of assets originally owned by a corporation could
be spun off in trust to investors, but still managed under a contract
by the corporate parent. Our analysis of course ignores all incentive
problems resulting from separation of ownership and management. See
Wolfson (1983) for a discussion of these problems in the context of
drilling partnerships.
13. Myers, Dill and Bautista (1976) conclude that there is no net
advantage to leasing in the one—period case. This conclusion is
driven by two assumptions that differ from ours: first, that any
owner can borrow without restriction and second, that the asset's
allowed depreciation, a, is equal to its purchase price va. Under
their assumptions, for any owner (individual or corporate) with tax




Solving for V yields
— C —1+r'
and thus asset value is independent of the owner's tax rate.
Intuitively, the disadvantage of debt for a wasting asset due to the
fact that principal repayment is not deductible is exactly offset in
this case by the advantage of depreciation, which exactly shelters
principal repayments. While the assumption that =ais quite
reasonable for depreciation, we construe to include other
nondepreciation tax shields, so that their total need not sum to the
asset's initial value.
14. If the maximum investor tax rate is equal to the effectivecorporate
rate, then the valuation formula in (9) continues to be valid.
15. More specifically the royalty trust distribution is considered a
dividend if the parent corporation has accumulated surplus on its tax
books.Otherwise, it is deemed a tax—free return of capital. See
Cooper (1984).
16. In practice, large distributions like these (or payments of arrearages
on preferred stock) are candidates for "dividend stripping" by
corporations that take advantage of the intercorporate dividend
exclusion and simultaneously recognize capital losses associated with
the price decline. If this is allowed, equilibrium may not exist on
the ex—dividend date.
17. There are two basic kinds of acquisitions: acquisitions that are
"taxable"for stockholders, and acquisitions that are "tax—free" for— 37—
stockholders."Tax—free" acquisitions generate no capital gains
liabilityfor stockholders, but they also do not allow for a step—up
in the tax basis of assets.The mechanism described here is a
"taxable" acquisition, which generates both a capital gains liability
anda step—up in the tax basis.
18.It is no longer possible to engage in a "partial liquidation" of the
acquiredcompany, as U.S. Steel did in acquiring Marathon Oil. This
device allowed U.S. Steel to step up the taxbasis of the Yates oil
field,without recognizing gains associated with Marathon's use of
LIlt accounting.— 38—
REFERENCES
ABRANS,B., 1984, "Metromedia Officers to Raise $300 Million by Assets Sale
Once Buyout Is Completed," Wall Street Journal (April 30).
BAILEY, N. J., 1974, "Progressivity and Investment Yields Under U.S. Income
Taxation," Journal of Political Economy, 82 (November/December),
pp. 1137—75.
BLACK, F., 1971, "Taxes and Capital Market Equilibrium," Working Paper No.
21A, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
COOPER, W., 1984, "Decorporatizing Corporate Assets," Institutional
Investor, 18 (May), pp. 171—6.
FAMA, E. F. and N.C.JENSEN, 1983a, "Separation of Ownership and Control,"
Journal of Law and Economics, 26(June),pp. 301—25.
___________________________1983b,"Agency Problems and Residual Claims,"
Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (June), pp. 327—49.
LEWELLEN, W. G., M. S. LONd and J. J. McCONNELL, 1976, "Asset Leasing in
Competitive Capital Markets," Journal of Finance 31 (June), pp.
787—98.
MILLER, M. II., 1977, "Debt and Taxes," Journal of Finance, 32 (May), pp.
261—75.
_____________andC. W. UPTON, 1976, "Leasing, Buying and the Cost of
Capital Services," Journal of Finance, 31 (June), pp. 761—86.
MYERS, S. D., D. A. DILL and A.J.BAUTISTA, 1976, "Valuation of Financial
Lease Contracts," Journal of Finance, 31 (June), pp. 799—819.
RUBACK, R. S., 1983, "Calculating the Present Value of Riskiess Cash
Flows," Working Paper No. 1348—83, Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.— 39—
WOLFSON,M. A., 1983, "Empirical Evidence of Incentive Problems and Their
Mitigation inOil and Gas Tax Shelter Programs," paper presented at
75th AnniversaryColloquium, "Asymmetric Information, the Agency
Problemand ModernBusiness Practice," Harvard BusinessSchool.